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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1962 the investment community was rocked by publication of a 
massive study of the mutual fund industry by the Wharton School of 
Finance. Sponsored by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the re-
port analyzed many areas of mutual fund management and influence. Par-
ticularly revealing, however, was the report's contention that on the 
average mutual funds performed no better than did an unmanaged portfolio 
represented by one or several of the popular market indices. 
During the period under study, performance records varied 
considerably, both within and among types of funds, but on the 
average conformed rather closely to the behavior of the securi-
ties markets as a whole. For the 5 3/4 years covered by the 
study, the Standard and Poor's Composite Common Stock Index was 
definitely superior to the average performance of the funds, 
but the disparity can be explained by the portfolio structure 
of the funds; i.e., the stocks, preferred stocks, corporate 
bonds, Government bonds, and other assets. When adjustments 
are maxie for this composition, the average performance of the 
funds did not differ appreciably from what would have been 
achieved by an unmanaged portfolio with the same division among 
asset types. About half performed better, half worse, than 
such an unmanaged portfolio. 
Initial industry reaction to the Wharton study was one of defense. 
The industry firmly maintained that while it could not beat the market 
Irwin Friend, et al., A Study of Mutual Funds, House Report No. 
2274, 87th Congress, Second Session (1962). 
2Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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averages, neither could the small investor buy the market averages, but 
only individual securities. The mutual fund could, however, provide 
the small investor with the benefits of broad diversification which the 
investor would be unable to acquire in any other way. 
Since this initial reaction to the Wharton study there has been 
an abrupt change in the views of mutual fund managers. Moving away from 
the long-term-investment concept to which they held for so long, managers 
appear to be making increasingly greater use of daily trading, options, 
warrants, letter stock, and other such speculative devices in order to 
boost the annual performance relatives of their funds. Recent articles 
4 5 6 
in Barron's, Fortune, and Forbes all look with increasing concern on 
the current trend toward management which seeks only high annual increases 
in portfolio net asset values. 
A prominent investment counselor summarizes the feelings of these 
and other observers as he discusses the current emphasis on performance: 
The most disturbing development in the investment field 
in many years is the rapidly rising pace of speculation. Evi-
dence of this growing fever is apparent on every hand. To 
begin with the volume of trading is increasing sharply. So far 
this year activity on the stock exchanges is 20 percent heavier 
than during the same period of 1966 and is almost double the level 
of two years ago. 
3 
Lucile Tomlinson Wessmann, Investment Companies (New York: Arthur 
Wiesenberger and Company, 1964), p. 77. 
4 
David A. Hoddeson, "Lambs or Lions," Barron's, Volume XLVTI, 
October 30, 1967, p. 3. "Talking Money," Barron's, Volume XLIX, July 
21, 1969, p. 5. Glenn, Armon, "Funds Worse Than DJI," Barron's, Volume 
XLIX, August 4, 1969, p. 23. 
5 
Arthur M. Louis, "Those Go Go Funds May be Going Nowhere," Fortune, 
Volume LXXVT, Number 6, November, 1967, p. 143. 
c. 
"Performance in Reverse?" Forbes, Volume CIII, Number 6, March 
15, 1969, p. 58. 
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Professional investment managers are major contributors to 
this greater activity. . . . Mutual funds, as a group, turned 
over their assets at an annual rate of 35 percent. 
This high rate of trading activity by professionals reflects, 
of course, the current race for "instant performance."7 
The Problem 
In light of the recent shift to performance oriented portfolio 
management, it becomes important for both the investment community and 
the mutual-fund investor to know whether such management is accomplishing 
its intended purposes. Is more aggressive portfolio management increasing 
portfolio performance? If the answer is yes, and if investors are willing 
to bear the greater risks to which they may be subjected, then portfolio 
managers are acting in the best interests of their investors. If, how-
ever, performance is not appreciably improved by this increased aggressive-
ness, then serious questions pertaining to cost and risk must be asked. 
Statement: of the Problem 
This study has the specific objective of testing the null hypothesis 
that investment company portfolio management is efficient. That is, in 
terms of portfolio performance, management has made a proper decision 
in making the tradeoff between profits derived from long term investment 
and profits derived from short-term market transactions; this tradeoff 
David L. Babson, "Performance—The Latest Name For Speculation?" 
Financial Analysts Journal, Volume XXIII, Number 5, September •October, 
1967, pp. 129-132. 
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has increased investor return over the return which could be realized 
from a relatively unmanaged diversified securities portfolio. 
JBnportance of the Problem 
Should the test of the null hypothesis be positive the mutual-fund 
industry would appear to be justified in accepting the tradeoff between 
long-term investment returns and short-term trading profits. Should the 
null hypothesis not be supported, however, the implications for the 
mutual fund industry appear to be threefold. 
First, the increasing institutionalization of investment has already 
raised pressing questions of public policy. Strains on the capacities 
of the organized exchanges and their member brokers resulting from in-
creased institutional trading have caused critical problems. Were these 
strains created by unnecessary securities transactions on the part of 
investment companies? 
Second, the cost of mutual-fund ownership is high. If sales-loading 
charges are amortized over the period of investment and added to annual 
management and custodial fees, the investor is surrendering a considerable 
portion of his annual investment income. Could these fees be reduced 
if management were spending less on transaction costs and the costs of 
investment advice? 
Third, while even the most conservative investor is pleased by 
superior performance, any given investor optimally should have placed 
his investment dollars in a portfolio which is efficient (in the 
Markowitzian sense) given his individual requirements. In abandoning 
the investment concept and turning to more speculative devices such as 
5 
daily trading is the fund manager also abandoning his fiduciary 
responsibility by subjecting his investor to expected return-variance 
of return combinations which violate his risk-return guidelines? 
Answers to these three questions, as well as to the multitude of 
questions which they in turn spawn, are of the gravest import to the 
investment community. 
Delimitation of the Study 
The securities markets are complicated, and it is likely virtually 
impossible to identify all the factors which affect performance of a 
securities portfolio. Far from attempting such identification, this 
study will examine and analyze those aspects of management which are 
most easily observed. 
Considering portfolio performance the dependent variable in each 
case, the following management variables will be considered in this 
study: (1) Frequency with which the securities portfolio is traded; 
(2) portfolio quality; and (3) the timing of the portfolio-turnover and 
portfolio quality decisions. 
Sources of Empirical Data Used in the Study 
Inasmuch as there is great interest in the mutual fund industry on 
the part of both potential investors and the primary regulatory agency, 
there is no paucity of information concerning the industry. The empiri-
cal data for this study was gathered from two sources: (1) Investor's 
services, principally Arthur Weisenberger and Company, Moody's Financial 
6 
Services, and Standard and Poor's Financial Services? and (2) from 
investment company annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange 
q 
Commission.3 
Outline of the Procedure 
Chapter II examines the work done in this area by other scholars, 
and discusses the methodology employed in testing the null hypothesis. 
Chapter III examines several highly visible management variables 
of ten randomly selected open-end investment companies in an attempt 
to determine the impact which these variables had on portfolio perfor-
mance. A mathematical model of simulated investment company portfolios 
is developed in this chapter, and the portoflio results produced by this 
simulation are compared with the portfolio results of the ten sample 
companies. 
Chapter IV expands the analytical process developed in Chapter III 
considerably and this process is applied to the analysis of 34 actual 
open-end investment companies. Particular emphasis is placed on deter-
mining the extent of the correlation between portfolio turnover and 
portfolio performance in the sample companies. A number of additional 
Lucile Tomlinson Wessmann, Investment Companies (New York: Arthur 
Wiesenberger and Company, Annually). St. Clair, F. J., Moody's Bank and 
Finance Manual (New York: Moody's Investor's Services, Inc., Annually). 
Standard and Poor's Stock Reports (New York: Standard and Poor's 
Corporation). 
g 
SEC Form N-1R, "Annual Report of Registered Management Investment 
Company." For an explanation of the report and its contents see SEC 
Document, Number 1101, March, 1968. 
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simulated portfolios are constructed, and the portfolio performance of 
the actual and simulated portfolios is compared. 
Chapter V, the final chapter, summarizes the study and states the 
conclusions. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERARY BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter examines the scholarly work which has been done in 
this area of investigation to date; and explains the methodology which 
is used to test the hypothesis set forth in Chapter I. 
Literary Background 
While the popular literature has devoted considerable time and space 
to policy problems of investment companies, the same problems have not 
been discussed extensively in the scholarly journals. 
Without doubt, the major contribution in this area was made by the 
Wharton study which was referred to in Chapter I. That report repre-
sents an enormous research effort, and examines virtually every aspect 
of mutual fund influence and impact. Chapters pertaining to investment 
policy and performance of investment companies are particularly germane 
to the present study. 
Over the period covered by the Wharton study, average mutual-fund 
portfolio turnover was found to be relatively constant, ranging between 
2 
a low of 26.7 percent and a high of 33.7 percent. Funds which were 
affiliated with brokers were found to have a higher rate of portfolio 
Friend, et al., op. cit. 
!Ibid., p. 214. 
8 
9 
turnover than non-affiliated companies. For the entire period the 
range of portfolio turnover rates for broker-affiliated companies was 
from 23.0 percent to 28.2 percent. For non-affiliated companies the 
3 
range varied between 17.6 percent and 23.6 percent during the period. 
Most significantly, the study reports a slightly negative correlation 
between rate of portfolio turnover and performance of the portfolio, 
indicating that management efforts to increase performance by trading 
had the opposite effect. This is the case when periodic performance 
is related to turnover of the portfolio in the same period and with 
turnover occurring in prior periods. 
In addition to testing the effects of portfolio turnover on perfor-
mance the study also examines the relationship of a number of other 
management variables to portfolio performance. It was found that size 
of management and custodial fees charged, sales-loading charges, affili-
ation of the fund with brokerage firms, and timing or amount of inflow 
of capital from sale of new shares all failed to exert any positive in-
5 
fluence on portfolio performance. 
In summary the study concludes, as noted in Chapter I, that the 
average mutual fund performed no better over the period of the study than 






In an excellent empirical study of fund performance Jensen reports 
that of 115 funds studies: 
. . . . (they) were on average not able to predict security 
prices well enough to outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy, 
but also there is very little evidence that any individual fund was 
able to do significantly better than that which we expected from 
mere random chance. It is also important to note that these con-
clusions hold even when we measure the fund returns gross of manage-
ment expenses (that is assume their book-keeping, research, and 
other expenses except brokerage commissions were obtained free). 
Thus on average the funds apparently were not quite successful 
enough in their trading activities to recoup even their brokerage 
expenses. 
Jensen's conclusions are based on the results of an empirical model 
designed to test the ability of fund managers to predict market movements, 
pick undervalued securities, and outperform the market as a whole. This 
model compares the annual, continuously compounded rate of return realized 
by individual mutual funds with a similar figure for the Standard and 
o 
Poor's Composite 500 Price Index. While Jensen's research methodology 
and period of study differ considerably from those used in the Wharton 
study, his conclusions with respect to mutual fund performance are 
essentially the same. 
A major contribution by Jensen which is deserving of future research 
is his use of a performance measure which considers the time value of 
money. The traditional measure of performance used by the fund industry 
7 
Michael C. Jensen, "The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 




is essentially a simple arithmetic-average percentage change in fund 
net asset value, and thus ignores the effects of cxampounding. A leading 
industry spokesman calculates portfolio performance by dividing "... ad-
9 
justed asset value for the period by beginning asset value." Adjusted 
asset value is defined as net asset value of the portfolio on the last 
day of the period under consideration, plus capital gains distributions 
10 
and dividends paid from investment income during the period. Mathe-
matically this relationship is expressed: 
N, + DC. + DI. 
R = _ 1 _ H . ' (2.1) 
t M 
Vi 
where: R = The periodic performance relative. 
N = Net asset value of the portfolio at the end of period t. 
DCt = Capital gains distributions during the period. 
DIfc = Dividends paid from investment income during the period. 
N. n = Beginning net asset value. 
The measure, as expressed, shows to what percentage of beginning 
net asset value ending adjusted net asset value has risen (or declined). 
To find the actual percentage change over the previous net asset value 
it is necessary to subtract 1.00 from whatever R is obtained. Using 
this measure the period length is unimportant since compounding is ig-
^fessmann, op. cit., 1964 edition, p. 81. See also Friend, et al., 
op. cit., p. 290. 
Ibid. 
12 
nored, and if the performance relative for a several-year period is 
calculated, capital gains and income distributions for all years within 
the period are merely summed to obtain adjusted net asset value. 
As an accurate measure of performance this industry relative is 
extremely weak, the principal weaknesses resulting from the fact that 
an arithmetic function is used in its calculation when an exponential 
function is clearly called for. Jensen recognized this problem in using 
a measure based on compounding. 
Dietz, who made an important contribution with his work on pension 
12 
funds, adapts this prior work to the problems of measurement of mutual 
13 
fund performance. Specifically he points out the need for a measurement 
model which considers both expected return and risk. Unfortunately he 
stops far short of developing such a model. He does, however, provide 
a revealing comparison between performance rankings resulting from the 
average method and from a simple measure which considers the effects 
of compounding. In this measure he solves for r in the equation 
C, (1 + r ) n + C (1 + r) 1 1" 1* . . . + C (1 + r) = M, (2.2) 
1 2 n 
where: C = A series of cash investments. 
"•Jensen, op. cit. 
12 
Peter 0. Dietz, Pension Funds: Measuring Investment Performance 
(New York: The Free Press, 1966). 
13 
Peter 0. Dietz, "Components of a Measurement Model: Rate of 
Return, Risk, and Timing," The Journal of Finance, Volume XXIII, Number 
2, May, 1968, pp. 267-275. 
13 
M = The ending market value of the investment. 
14 
r = The rate of return of the investment. 
A somewhat more complete model for evaluation of portfolio perfor-
15 
mance is proposed by Treynor. In this model he evaluates performance 
by relating expected rate of return of an investment portfolio with 
rate of return of what he calls a "suitable market average." These 
expected rates are plotted graphically with expected market rate as the 
independent variable, and expected portfolio rate as the dependent vari-
able. The resulting function is the expected return-variance of return 
"characteristic line" for the portfolio in question. Variance of port-
folio return resulting from fluctuation of the stock market is indicated 
by the degree of steepness of the portfolio characteristic line. Vari-
ance of return resulting from price fluctuation of portfolio securities 
is observed by portfolio returns which are recorded as points off the 
16 
portfolio characteristic line. 
While Treynor's performance measure specifies neither an average 
nor a compounding method for rate-of-return calculation, either would 
be adaptable to the technique. 
14Ibid., p. 270. 
15 
Jack L. Treynor, "How to Rate Management of Investment Funds," 
Harvard Business Review, Volume XLIII, Number 1, January-February, 1965, 
pp. 63-75. 
16 
For an excellent graphical presentation of this evaluation pro-
cess see ibid., p. 65. 
14 
Unlike other performance measures this technique enables the in-
vestor to analyze both expected return and variance of return for speci-
f 
fie portfolios. The analyst may also make return-risk comparisons 
between alternative portfolios—something impossible to accomplish with 
other methods of evaluation. For example, portfolios with identical 
return risk characteristics would have the same portfolio characteristic 
line. Portfolios with different expected return, but the same degree of 
risk would have portfolio characteristic lines with the same slope, but 
with different y intercepts. Finally, portfolios with both different 
return and risk characteristics would have portfolio characteristic lines 
17 
which share neither common slopes nor common intercepts. 
These studies serve to provide a background for the work to be done 
by the author in this study; and point out the relative scarcity of em-
pirical work designed to test the efficiency of investment company port-
folio management. 
Research Methodology 
As outlined in Chapter I, the purpose of this study is to test the 
null hypothesis that investment company portfolio management is efficient. 
Symbolically stated, this hypothesis would appear 
H : R > R , 
0 m u 
where: R„ = The performance of a managed investment company 
portfolio , 
R^ = The performance of an unmanaged investment company 
portfolio. 
Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
15 
The alternative hypothesis may be symbolically stated as 
H.: R > R . 
1 u m 
In order to test the hypothesis two separate approaches were used. 
The first was a case study designed to analyze the effect of management 
decisions on performance of ten mutual funds. The second was an evalua-
tion of several management variables as they relate to the performance of 
a larger sample of 34 mutual funds. This portion of the study was 
designed to develop data from which statistical inferences regarding the 
population of all funds could be made. Each of these approaches will be 
briefly discussed in the following sections. 
The Case Study 
From the population of all mutual funds offered to the public at the 
18 
beginning of 1964 a sample of ten companies was drawn. For each of 
these ten companies an evaluation of the effect of portfolio management 
on performance was made. Specifically, the effects of portfolio quality, 
portfolio turnover, and timing of the quality and turnover decisions were 
tested. 
As part of this test, simulated portfolios were constructed for each 
of the ten companies, and performance of the simulation models was compared 
with actual portfolio performance of the sample companies. The simulated 
As listed in Wessmann, op. cit., 1964 edition. 
16 
portfolio for a given fund consisted of all securities contained in the 
actual fund as of December 31, 1963, in the exact percentage composition 
which was extant in the actual portfolio on that date. Each of these 
simulated portfolios was then held, without management, for the period 
of the study. Performance results of the simulated portfolios indicate 
what performance of the actual fund would have been had its management 
elected not to effect any changes in the original portfolio. 
While it would be desirable to enlarge this sample to a size large 
enough to insure dependable statistical inference, costs of data genera-
tion are prohibitive. 
Study of the Larger Sample 
From the 1964 population of all mutual funds, another sample was 
drawn which was of sufficient size to provide data for accurate statisti-
cal inference. For this sample the annual rates of portfolio turnover 
for each of the companies were computed for the period of the study. 
Statistical tests were made to determine: (1) Trends in portfolio activity 
over the period studied; and (2) statistical correlation between portfolio 
turnover and portfolio performance. 
Finally, a large number of simulated portfolios were constructed by 
drawing securities at random from the population of all securities avail-
able in the market place on December 31, 1963. These portfolios were 
constructed using varying degrees of diversification, initial net asset 
values, and subsequent annual capital input (*). Each of the portfolios 
17 
was, however, held without management over the period of study. Per-
formance of the unmanaged simulation models was compared with performance 
of the actual portfolios. Statistical tests were performed to analyze 
significance of the variance of mean returns of the two samples, and to 
draw inferences regarding the total population of all mutual funds. 
Period of Study 
The period of time covered by this study ran from January 1, 1964 
through December 31, 1968. This period was chosen specifically because 
it represented one of the longest bull markets in history; and was 
interrupted only by a short but sharp bear market during a portion of 
1966. In an extended bull market such as this it would be expected that 
a broadly diversified portfolio selected under any criteria, including 
complete randomness, should achieve at least a reasonably high level of 
performance. If this expectation is correct, then it is also reasonable 
to assume that any management action with respect to portfolio quality, 
composition, or turnover should increase performance over the level 
achieved with a less intensively managed portfolio. Likewise, portfolio 
changes made by fund management prior to or during a bear market would be 
expected to dampen the effects of the market decline on portfolio perfor-
mance. 
Since the study covers a specific and peculiar market period, how-
ever, it should not be inferred that the results of this study are 
applicable to other, dissimilar periods. 
18 
Measure of Performance Used 
The difficulties encountered in measuring investment company per-
formance are numerous. The advantages and disadvantages of several 
alternative methods were presented in the first part of this chapter. 
While both theory and commonsense dictate use of a method which 
recognizes the timing and shape of cash flows, the average method has 
instead been employed. It will be remembered that this method measures 
performance according to the formula 
N t + DIfc + DCt 
R t = . (2.3) 
Nt-1 
There are several reasons for the selection of this measure of 
performance. First, this is the measure used by the major statistical 
services which report fund performance. Use of another, more theoreti-
cally correct, measure would require conversion of all currently avail-
able performance data to the new measure. While this is possible it would 
be both time consuming and expensive. Second, the use of another perfor-
mance measure would make comparison of data generated in this study with 
unadjusted industry data not only difficult but largely meaningless. In 
order that such comparisons may be made it was decided to follow the 
generally accepted and most widely used method of determining performance. 
• •• • I I - » ii i «•!!• • in m w m m •"*• W «•• •"*• m-^ »•» 
19 
See page 11 of this study for an explanation of the notation and 
implications of this method. 
19 
Measure of Turnover Used 
As with performance, there are a number of alternative methods of 
20 
calculating the rate of portfolio turnover. The Wharton study, and 
Brown and Vickers laoth suggest several alternative methods and the 
advantages of each. 
The measure of turnover selected for use in this study is the one 
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission as part of the annual 
reports required of all registered investment companies. This measure 
is simply: " (A) The lesser of purchases or sales of portfolio securities 
for the particular fiscal year divided by (B) the monthly average of the 
value of the portfolio securities owned by the registrant during the 
22 
particular fiscal year." Inasmuch as the lesser of purchases or sales 
is used in the computation, a fund could have only purchases or sales 
in a period (as the result of the sale or redemption of fund shares) and 
experience no turnover. 
While this measure is less elegant than alternative methods it has 
the advantage of being used exclusively by the SEC, and therefore all 
data generated in this study is easily compared with a bank of data in 
which the entire mutual fund industry is represented. 
friend, et al., op. cit., pp. 224-235. 
21F. E. Brown, and Douglas Vickers, "Mutual Fund Activity, Performance, 
and Market Impact," The Journal of Finance, Volume XVIII, Number 2, May, 
196T, pp. 377-391. 
CHAPTER III 
AN ANALYSIS OF TEN SELECTED COMPANIES 
It will be remembered that the purpose of this study is to test the 
hypothesis that investment company portfolio management is efficient. 
In order to provide a partial test of this hypothesis an analysis was 
made of several key management variables in ten investment companies. 
The ten companies were selected randomly from the January 1, 1964 
population of all investment companies. The selection was made at ran-
dom not because the results of this analysis are to be used for purposes 
of statistical inference, but rather to insure an impartially selected 
sample. Because of the sampling technique used the sample should be 
free of any bias on the part of the researcher which might affect the 
outcome of the results. 
The ten companies selected for analysis are listed in Table 1, and 
represent a broad spectrum of the industry. As noted in Table 1 there 
is only slight dissonance among the companies as to stated investment ob-
jectives. There is, however, considerable variation in the methods 
employed by the various companies to achieve the stated objectives. 
Over the five-year period covered by the study there was found to 
be considerable variation in both the methods in which portfolio-manage-
ment variables were combined, and the performance results produced by 
these combinations. This variation occurred from year to year within 




TEN SELECTED COMPANIES 
AND THEIR STATED INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES* 
Company Stated Objectives 
Perm Square Mutual Fund 
The Chase Fund of Boston 
Guardian Mutual Fund 
Keystone Series (S-2) Income Fund 
National Securities Stock Series 
Financial Industrial Fund 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversified Fund 











Key: G = Growth, I = Income 
* As stated in Wessmann, op. cit., 1964 edition. 
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While it would be dangerous to infer that the sample results re-
present the population, a study of the sample results does provide 
useful insight about the efficiency of portfolio management. Such a 
study also builds a foundation for a more broadly based statistical an-
alysis which will be developed in Chapter IV of this study. 
A principal vehicle for analysis of the material included in this 
chapter was a mathematical-simulation model of investment company port-
folios. Development of this model and analysis of the results it pro-
duced will be accomplished in a subsequent section of this chapter. The 
chapter will also include an analysis of the effects on performance of port-
folio turnover and its timing; and portfolio quality and the timing of 
the quality decision. 
Development and Results of The Mathematical Simulation 
The most obvious indication of the degree of intensity of portfolio 
management is the rate at which the investment portfolio is turned over 
or traded. It is reasonable to assume that the sole purpose for port-
folio turnover is to boost investment performance over that level of 
performance which may have been achieved had some previous portfolio 
position been maintained. In order to test the null hypothesis, therefore, 
it is necessary to determine whether or not the management decision to 
disturb an initial portfolio position did in fact affect performance 
positively. If trading fulfilled its intended purpose then it would be 
proper to accept the null hypothesis. That is, management was efficient 
(with respect to the portfolio-turnover variable) in its portfolio manage-
ment function. 
23 
Should it be shown that portfolio turnover exerted no positive 
influence on performance, or that performance was adversely affected by 
trading, it would be proper to select the alternative hypothesis. That is, 
management was inefficient in its portfolio management function. 
In order to make this test January 1, 1964 portfolio positions were 
determined for each of the ten companies in the sample. These 1964 
portfolio positions became the basis for each of ten simulated portfolios 
for the ensuing five-year period in that no new securities were added 
to, nor were any securities deleted from, the 1964 portfolios. Capital 
changes in individual companies which resulted from sale or redemption 
of shares resulted, in turn, in purchase of securities for the portfolios, 
or sale of securities from the portfolios. Only securities contained in 
the beginning portfolios were purchased, however, and dollar amounts of 
all purchases and sales were based completely on the 1964 percentage 
composition of each security in each of the various portfolios. 
For example, if security i in portfolio 1 constituted five percent 
of the 1964 net asset value of portfolio 1, five percent of all iiicoming 
capital in subsequent quarters would be used to purchase security i. 
Likewise, if there should be a negative capital input to the portfolio 
during any given period (i.e. share redemptions exceed share sales) five 
percent of the capital outflow would be contributed by selling a portion 
of the investment in security i. The model is much more easily explained 
in symbolic form. Its mathematical development is outlined below. 
24 
Mathematical Development of the Model 
Distribution of incoming capital (±) to a single security is 
accomplished according to the equation 
(3.1) 
Shares (or other units of ownership) of a given security are pur-
chased, and total number of shares in that security are determined by 
modifying (3.1) such that 
1 
S. = K • I. 
H t xt^0 
Nt=0' ^ 
- + Sit-1 
and (3.2) may be further simplied to 
(3.2) 
S,- = K • I, Pj + S. !t t lt=0 lt Nt_Q ^lt-1 (3.3) 
Incoming capital (±) is distributed to all securities in the port-
folio, and portfolio net asset value of the simulation model in period 






Finally, the portfolio performance relative for period t is deter-
mined by 
n 







Notation for the model is as follows: 
I. = Dollar investment in security i, January 1, 1964 1t=0 
AI. = Periodic incremental investment in security i. 
Kj. = Periodic capital inflow (±) to the portfolio resulting 
from sale or redemption of shares. 
S*_ = Total number of shares of security i held at the end of 
"^ each period. 
N. = Periodic net asset value of the portfolio. 
P- = Periodic price of security i. 
D. = Periodic dividend (or interest payment) paid on security i. 
R. = Periodic performance relative of the portfolio. 
Brokerage commissions on securities transactions in the model are 
computed according to the equation 




B = Total brokerage commissions paid on all portfolio trans-
fc actions during period t. 
c = Variable portion of the brokerage commission, determined 
from Table 2. 
























*John C. Clendenin, Introduction to Investments (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 204. 
To summarize the workings of the model: (1) The percentage com-
position of the January 1, 1964 portfolio is calculated; (2) based on 
that composition all incoming capital (±) is distributed to the port-
folio; (3) based on securities prices and investment income, an annual 
performance relative is computed; and (4) brokerage commissions on 
portfolio transactions are determined. 
Assumptions and Weaknesses of the Model 
Because of the large volume of information which must be processed 
by the model a number of simplifying assumptions were made. It is not 
believed that any of these assumptions has a significant effect, either 
positive or negative, on the results produced by the model, but they 
should nevertheless be explained. 
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At the beginning of 1964 the combined portfolios of the ten 
companies selected for the study contained approximately 900 mutually 
exclusive securities, To obtain perfectly accurate price and dividend 
information for the model it would have been necessary to search out 
the quarter-end price for each of the 900 securities for each of twenty 
consecutive quarters. In addition, annual dividend data and information 
as to stock splits, stock dividends, and other transactions which make 
price adjustment necessary would have been required. 
In lieu of quarter-end prices the quarterly price for each security 
was assumed to be the simple average of the high and low price for the 
security. This information was obtained in as accurate a manner as 
possible from stock-price charts published by Standard and Poor's 
Corporation. All price and dividend data were fully adjusted for 
stock splits, stock dividends, and for other items requiring price 
adjustment. 
While this is an approximation of the actual quarter-end price, 
it is believed that the results produced are of sufficient accuracy to 
yield valid results in the model. To test the accuracy of the pricing 
method 250 security-quarter price combinations were checked against 
actual quarter-end prices. In 57 percent of the cases checked the 
interpolated average price was understated. This understatement caused 
the model to purchase slightly more of a given security, but the lower 
prices also tended to undervalue the periodic ending value of simulated 
Standard and Poor's Stock Reports (New York: Standard and Poor's 
Corporation). 
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portfolio, making the model biased toward understatement of performance. 
Of course just the opposite effect would obtain in the 43 percent of 
the cases where the interpolated average price was overstated. Therefore, 
while the price data used in this study cannot be considered perfectly 
accurate, it is certainly of sufficient reliability to be used in a 
study of this type. 
In many cases securities which were contained in the 1964 portfolios 
ceased to exist at some time during the period of the study. The most 
common reason for this phenomena was merger, although in some instances 
a company went out of business completely. In those cases where a 
merger was effected the funds invested in the initial security were 
transferred to securities of the surviving entity according to the 
provisions of the merger terms. Where this was not possible because of 
lack of information or because a company went out of business, the funds 
invested in the initial security were taken into treasury bills. It 
is reasonably certain that this ultra-conservative decision rule would 
never be followed in management of an actual portfolio. For purposes 
of the simulation model however, there is no available criterion to use 
in selecting another common stock. This decision rule, of course, builds 
into the model another bias towards understated performance. The extent 
to which this bias would work against the model would be a function of 
the extent to which the 1964 portfolios held stocks which, for some reason, 
went out of existence during the five-year period of the study. 
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Because the model allocates funds to a security irrespective of 
current price, it must buy x dollars worth of any security at the pre-
vailing price. Invariably this results in the purchase of one fractional 
unit of every security in each portfolio each time capital is distri-
buted. To eliminate ownership of fractional units the computer program 
for the model was designed to round fractional units to the nearest whole 
unit. Again, this introduces some error into the model in that more 
or less shares are purchased than should actually be the case with a 
given level of capital input. In the long run errors from this source 
should be minimized as a result of the rounding process. Several key 
sample models were analyzed and compared with models where rounding was 
not accomplished, and in each case the error from rounding was found to 
be minimal. 
Of somewhat greater concern is a bias for the model to calculate 
brokerage commissions which are slightly less than actual commissions 
indicated by prevailing brokerage rates. This results from use of the 
commission schedule for round-lot purchases when in fact virtually 
every purchase is entirely or partially an odd-lot transaction. Like-
wise the model calculates commissions on bonds at the same rates as 
on stock transactions. Also it ignores federal and state transfer taxes. 
While these are fairly drastic simplifications, their impact on the 
overall results of the model are relatively insignificant. Inasmuch 
as brokerage commissions are paid from management and custodial fees 
charged the shareholder, the capital input of the model is unaffected 
by any error in commissions resulting from the above shortcomings. 
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The primary purpose for computing the commission in the simulation 
model was to enable comparison with commissions paid by the actual port-
folios. Unfortunately the Securities and Exchange Commission considers 
such data as non-public information, necessitating estimation of the 
commissions actually paid by the various companies included in the study. 
The extremely conservative estimating procedure used virtually reduces 
to zero the significance of the small error in the simulated commission 
figures. 
A bias which tends to work against the model is distribution of 
capital inflows according to 1964 portfolio composition. If a security 
is increasing in price in the marketplace the model will automatically 
buy less of that security than if the security were remaining at a rela-
tively constant price. Conversely, if the price of a security is de-
teriorating, the model will automatically purchase more of that security 
than would otherwise be the case. Thus, while it might be advantageous 
in actual practice to buy more of a certain security which is rapidly 
increasing in price, the model does just the opposite. And while a 
portfolio manager might elect to dispose of (or at least not buy) a 
stock whose price is deteriorating, the model automatically buys more 
of that stock. The result of this bias is an automatic damper on per-
formance of the simulation model. 
Finally, while quarterly distribution of incoming capital was 
effected in the model, this allocation was assumed to be one fourth 
See page 26 of this study for an explanation of the technique used 
in estimating actual commissions. 
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of the annual capital input figures for the respective funds as re-
ported to the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the actual funds, 
of course, there would always be some—and perhaps a great deal—of 
fluctuation in capital input from quarter to quarter. Insofar as the 
actual cfuarterly inputs differed frcm one-fourth the annual capital 
input, the performance of the model is affected. 
On the other side of the coin, however, managers of the actual 
portfolios would have purchased securities as funds became available 
rather than accumulating iiiccming capital until the end of each quarter 
as the model does. To this extent the model is biased against itself 
since it loses the benefit derived from immediate investment of incoming 
funds. 
Results of the Model 
As explained in the preceding section, hypothetical portfolios were 
constructed for each of the ten companies contained in the sample. In 
each case the hypothetical portfolio on which the model was based was 
the actual portfolio of a given company as of January 1, 1964. In each 
case the capital inputs taken into each hypothetical portfolio were 
the actual capital inputs of the respective companies for each of the 
five years of the study. The model was designed to show what perfor-
mance results would have been had managers of the actual portfolios 
engaged in no trading over the five-year period in question. The annual 
results of both the actual and the simulated portfolios are summarized 
in Table 3. 
From Securities and Exchange Commission Form N-lR, "Annual 
Report of Registered Management Investment Company." 
TABIE 3 
lERFORMaNCE OF ACTUAL AND SIMULATED PORTFOLIOS 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES: 1964-1968 
Company 
Penn Square Mutual Fund 
The Chase Fund of Boston 
Guardian Mutual Fund 
Keystone Series (S-2) Income Fund 
National Securities—Stock Series 
Financial Industrial Fund 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversified Fund 






















































































































It is significant to note from this table that of the 50 port-
folio years considered in the study, the unmanaged, simulated port-
folios performed as well as, or better than the actual, managed port-
folios in 28 of the 50 portfolio years, or 56 percent of the time. 
Table 4 shows the mean return of the ten simulated portfolios to exceed 
the mean return of the actual portfolios in two (1966 and 1968) of the 
five years covered by the study. In two years (1964 and 1965) the mean 
performance relatives were extremely close. Only in 1967 did performance 
of the actual portfolios substantially exceed performance of the simulated 
portfolios. This difference is partially explained by the fact that the 
mean performance relative of the actual companies was 50 percent lower 
than the performance relative of the simulated portfolios in the 
previous year. 
TABLE 4 
MEAN PERFORMSNCE OF ACTUAL AND SIMULATED PORTFOLIOS 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES: 1964-1968 
Mean Performance 
Actual Simulated 
Year Portfolios Portfolios 
1964 13.7% 11.9% 
1965 24.2 21.4 
1966 ( 5.8) ( 2.4) 
1967 35.7 21.9 
1968 17.3 18.5 
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From a long-term investment viewpoint the five-year performance 
figures summarized in Table 5 may be more meaningful than the annual 
figures presented above. Over the five-year period the unmanaged 
simulation models outperformed the actual portfolios in five of the ten 
cases. In two instances the actual portfolios performed slightly better 
than the unmanaged simulations. In only three of ten cases did the 
actual portfolios perform significantly better than did their corres-
ponding simulation models. It should be pointed out that in those three 
cases the actual portfolios performed far better than did their corres-
ponding simulation models. Likewise, the differences between actual and 
simulated performance in these three cases were significantly greater than 
the differences between the two in the cases where simulated portfolios 
outperformed actual portfolios. 
TABLE 5 
PERFORMANCE OF ACTUAL AND SIMULATED PORTFOLIOS 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES: Five Years 1964-1968 
Performance Relatives 
Company 
Penn Square Mutual Fund 
The Chase Fund of Boston 
Guardian Mutual Fund 
Keystone Series (S-2) Income Fund 
Financial Industrial Fund 
National Securities—Stock Series 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversified Fund 


























Commissions paid to brokers and dealers, and costs of portfolio 
management do not generally enter into the computation of investment 
company performance. Indeed, while the Securities and Exchange 
Commission requires investment companies to include commissions paid 
in their annual reports, the information is classified and was there-
fore unavailable for inclusion in this study. These costs, nevertheless, 
are significant in that loading charges, management fees, and custodial 
fees charged the investment company shareholder, and from which commissions 
are paid, all tend to reduce the effective return from the company to 
the shareholder. In theory, if not in practice, these fees, which are 
assessed the shareholder, are a function of the actual costs incurred 
in managing the portfolio plus a reasonable profit to the company. It 
seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that if management costs could 
be reduced, the direct costs of mutual fund ownership could also be 
reduced. 
While the classified nature of commission data makes meaningful 
comparison difficult, Table 6 gives some insight into the problem 
of transaction costs. The simulated commissions in this table were 
generated frcm the mathematical model developed in the earlier part of 
this chapter. Brokerage commissions on actual portfolios were based on 
the extremely conservative assumption that all portfolio changes were 
accomplished in twenty equal transactions. The size of these trans-
actions was determined by dividing the total of annual security purchases 
and annual security sales by twenty. The estimated commission was 
calculated, then, according to the relationship 
TABLE 6 
BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS PAID BY ACTUAL AND SIMULATED PORTFOLIOS 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES: 1964-1968 
1964 1965 1966 
Company Model Actual Model Actual Model 
Penn Square Mutual Fund 23,520 71,588 
$ $ $ 
54,600 108,233 44,436 
Chase Fund of Boston 
Guardian Mutual Fund 






Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversi-
fied Fund 
Blue Ridge Mutual Fund 
1,368 38,231 12,080 21,329 2,588 
21,132 31,948 19,932 40,824 18,332 
20,880 44,217 12,064 108,937 22,504 








35,132 117,691 32,936 96,105 32,056 165,721 
113,828 408,609 243,080 774,583 408,600 1,538,397 
9,244 129,908 8,844 31,621 10,244 30,784 
10,944 11,789 14,072 14,886 12,328 12,892 
1,656 16,401 13,536 24,201 13,568 19,467 
1967 1968 
Model Actual Model Actual 
$ $ $ $ 
4,872 384,771 6,720 65,286 
16,456 75,632 34,576 58,764 
18,732 55,799 22,332 75,203 
26,912 136,430 1,392 125,780 
27,480 118,240 22,992 141,731 
19,248 286,118 25,016 536,800 
211,076 1,776,031 213,037 2,367,102 
12,044 39,132 31,644 71,320 
10,944 24,091 9,552 23,282 
12,616 17,199 6,676 34,384 
B t= { [ 0 ? t + StX. ^ J - c + C J - 20 
where: Bfc = Periodic brokerage ccmnissions. 
P = Periodic securities purchases. 
S t = Periodic Securities sales. 
c = Variable portion of the commission. 
4 
C = Fixed portion of the commission. 
Even with this very conservative estimate of actual commissions it 
is observed that annual commissions on the simulated portfolios are 
generally but a small fraction of the estimated actual commissions of 
the actual portfolios. This is extremely significant in that the 
commission expense is presumably incurred only in an attempt to in-
crease portfolio performance. If performance was unaffected by trading 
activity, or if trading activity resulted in performance declines, then 
commissions paid to brokers and dealers was largely a waste. 
See commission schedule, page 26of this study. 
38 
Interpretation of the Simulation Results 
The simulation results outlined in the preceding pages are meaning-
ful in several respects. First, in a significant number of instances 
conpanies in the sample would have realized performance equal to or 
greater than that actually recorded had 1964 portfolio positions not 
been disturbed. In the cases where simulated portfolios performed 
better than actual portfolios the original portfolio positions obviously 
were well selected. But a tactical error was committed by the portfolio 
managers of these companies as they attempted to boost annual performance 
relatives by abandoning the concept of long-term investment and turning 
instead to a trading tactic. This error was compounded by the fact that 
the shareholders in these companies were penalized (in addition to de-
creased performance) by being forced to pay, in their annual management 
and custodial assessments, the costs of this trading activity. 
In the several cases where actual performance and simulated per-
formance were roughly equal, the shareholder was still penalized, but 
not to as great an extent as in the previous case. While performance 
relatives of actual and simulated portfolios were roughly equal in 
these cases the shareholders nevertheless were forced to bear the costs 
of portoflio transactions which were largely ineffectual in raising 
performance relatives above what could have been realized by maintaining 
1964 portfolio positions. 
Except for the three companies whose portfolio performance exceeded 
the performance of their respective simulation models, the following 
conclusions must be reached: (1) The companies subjected their stock-
holders to portfolio positions which were inefficient in the Markowitzian 
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sense in that either expected return of the portfolio was lower, or 
variance of return of the portfolio was greater in subsequent portfolio 
positions than what was present in the original (1964) portfolios. There-
fore these subsequent portfolio positions must be considered less 
efficient than the original positions. (2) The companies were further 
inefficient in that they subjected their shareholders to trading costs 
which not only produced no positive results, but in many cases resulted 
in performance inferior to that realized by portfolios which were subjected 
to no management whatsoever, an apparent case of sending good money after 
bad. 
Examination of Other Management Variables 
In this section certain management variables are examined to de-
termine their effect, if any, on portfolio performance of the ten sample 
companies. These variables are: (1) Portfolio turnover and timing of 
the turnover decision; and (2) portfolio quality and timing of the 
quality decision. 
Portfolio Turnover and Timing 
The results of the simulation model explained in the preceding 
section offer sound evidence that there is little correlation between 
portfolio activity and portfolio performance in the ten sample companies. 
As pointed out previously, a significantly large number of the sample 
portfolios performed as well or better without any trading activity in 
their portfolios as they did with activity. This indicates that attempts 
on the part of the managers of these portfolios to increase performance 
via the trading route were ill advised. 
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Table 7 shows the extent to which the fund managers of the sample 
companies relied on short-term trading in their portfolio management. 
The table summarizes turnover rates, annual and five-year average per-
formance relatives, and stated investment objectives of the sample 
companies. 
Table 11 shows that with few exceptions, turnover of each of the 
sample companies increased quite significantly over the period of the 
study. More significantly, the composite average turnover rate of the 
ten companies almost doubled from 38.8 percent in 1964 to 66.5 percent 
in 1968. There were increases in turnover rates in each of the interim 
years. 
A comparison of the data in this table with results of the Wharton 
study is revealing. The 1964 average turnover rate for the sample 
companies is 36 percent higher than the highest turnover rate recorded 
by any company in the five-and-one-half year period covered by the 
Wharton report. The 1968 turnover rate is more than 135 percent higher 
than the highest turnover of any company included in the Wharton study." 
The five-year composite average turnover rate for the sample was 
259.3 percent. This means that on the average the companies in the 
study experienced more than two-and-one-half complete changes in their 
portfolios over the five-year period covered by the study—with little 
significant impact on portfolio performance. 
friend, et al., op. cit., pp. 223-225. See also page8 of this 
study. 
TABLE 7 
PORTFOLIO TURNOVER RATES, PERFORMANCE RELATIVES, AND STATED INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES: 1964-1968 
Company 
Penn Square Mutual Fund 
Chase Fund of Boston 
Guardian Mutual Fund 




Financial Industrial Fund 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversified 
Fund 
Blue Ridge Mutual Fund 
























































































































































While no statistical tests were performed on this small sample, 
Table 7 reveals no correlation between timing of the turnover decision 
and performance of the portfolio. An especially strong year in which 
to look for correlation is 1966. Because the 1966 bear market occurred 
within the first six months of that year it is reasonable to assume that 
portfolio adjustments in anticipation of that market decline would have 
been made in late 1965. If that is the case such adjustments would be 
reflected in 1965 turnover figures. Quite to the contrary, Table 7 
shows only a slight increase in portfolio acticity in 1965 over 1964. 
There was a large increase in portfolio activity in 1966, however, 
which indicates that portfolio management may have reacted to the decline 
after it was underway rather than anticipating it. Table 8 relates 
1965 turnover to 1966 performance. Of the four companies whose turnover 
exceeded the 1965 ten-company average (and hence might be presumed to 
have anticipated the market decline) two did better and two did worse 
than the average 1966 performance of the ten companies. Of the six 
companies whose turnover was below the 1965 average, four registered 
below average performance and two did better than average. Thus, there 
appears to be no evidence that managers of these ten portfolios either 
(1) foresaw the 1966 bear market and moved to protect their portfolios 
against it, or (2) made any portfolio changes in 1966 which significantly 
influenced 1966 performance. 
Analyzing the effect which 1966 portfolio transactions might have 
had on 1966 performance there likewise appears to be no correlation 
between the two. While 1966 turnover increased markedly over the previous 
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TABLE 8 
TOENG OF TURNOVER DECISION 
IN ANTICIPATION OF 1966 BEAR MARKET 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES 
Company 
Penn Square Mutual Fund 
The Chase Fund of Boston 
Guardian Mutual Fund 
Keystone Series (S-2) Income Fund 
National Securities—Stock Series 
Financial Industrial Fund 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversified Fund 
























Above Average Performance 2 
Below Average Performance 2 
Number of Companies Having Below Average Turnover 6 
Above Average Performance 2 
Below Average Performance 4 
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year, Table 9 indicates that those companies which experienced the 
greatest portfolio activity fared no better than those who had less 
turnover. Relating 1966 turnover to 1966 performance, of the five com-
panies experiencing above average turnover three registered worse per-
formance than the 1966 average, and two did better. Of the five com-
panies experiencing below average turnover, the results were identical— 
two did better, and three worse than the 1966 average performance. As 
with the previous case there appears to be no correlation between port-
folio turnover and portfolio performance where each occurs in the same 
year. 
Portfolio Quality and Timing 
Another management variable which is of sufficient visibility to 
be easily analyzed is quality of the investment portfolio. For pur-
poses of this study the portfolio of each sample company was assigned 
a weighted-average-quality index. The basis for this index was Standard 
g 
and Poor's common stock rankings published monthly by that company. 
These rankings are based on company earnings, dividends, and stability; 
and have a range of from A+ to C. Some securities receive an N. R. 
"... which signifies no ranking possible, because of insufficient data, 
non-recurring factors, or some other reason." Table 10 outlines the 
For an explanation of these rankings and their method of deter-




TIMING OF TURNOVER DECISION 
DURING 1966 BEAR MARKET 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES 
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Company 
Penn Square Mutual Fund 
The Chase Fund of Boston 





Keystone Series (S-2) Income Fund Above Average 
National Securities—Stock Series Below Average 
Financial Industrial Fund 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversified Fund 
Blue Ridge Mutual Fund 
Number of Companies Having Above Average Turnover 
Above Average Performance 
Below Average Performance 
Number of Companies Having Below Average Turnover 
Above Average Performance 
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quality rankings and the relative numerical weights assigned to each 
for purposes of establishing the quality index used in this study. 
In the majority of cases the portfolios of each of the ten compan-
ies in the sample consisted completely of common stocks. In the few 
cases where bonds and preferred stocks were present they were given a 
ranking on the above scale which was most nearly consistent with the 
Standard and Poor's bond or preferred stock rating they possessed. Con-
vertible bonds, if trading at a price in excess of that at which bonds of 
similar quality were trading, were given the ranking of their corres-
ponding common stock. Treasury securities and short-term corporate 
notes were given an A+ ranking under the assumption that they were being 
held in lieu of cash for purposes of liquidity. Cash, of course, was 
given an A+ ranking. Table 11 summarizes the quality indices assigned 
to each portfolio under this ranking system. 
As shown in Table 11 nine of the ten conpanies in the sample began 
1964 with portfolio quality indices of five or above (average or higher 
on the Standard and Poor's ranking scale). Over the period of the study, 
however, nine of the ten companies recorded deterioration in portfolio 
quality; and only two companies ended 1968 with quality indices above 
the "Below Average" level on the Standard and Poor's scale. 
While there is no theoretical basis supporting such a shift it must 
be assumed that portfolio managers of the sample companies turned to more 
speculative portfolios in hopes of increasing portfolio performance. If 
performance is assumed to be an inverse function of portfolio quality, 
however, there seems to be no clear-cut correlation, positive or negative, 
between the portfolio quality and performance. 
TABLE 11 
PORTFOLIO QUALITY INDICES 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES: 1964-1968 
Company 
Penn Square Mutual Fund 
Chase Fund of Boston 
Guardian Mutual Fund 
Keystone Series (S-2) Income Fund 
National Securities—Stock Series 
Financial Industrial Fund 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversified Fund 
Blue Ridge Mutual Fund 
Quality Indices 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
5.00 5.44 3.67 4.67 4.24 
2.71 3.28 4.20 2.86 3.49 
6.07 6.47 5.48 5.67 5.55 
5.99 5.34 4.81 5.66 4.59 
5.47 5.38 5.86 5.58 5.37 
5.33 5.30 5.56 5.28 4.28 
4.73 4.24 5.34 4.66 4.54 
5.41 5.26 4.06 4.42 4.14 
5.71 6.02 5.47 4.67 3.26 
5.85 5.72 5.28 5.28 5.65 
Average of all Companies 5.23 5.25 4.98 4.89 4.51 
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Table 12 shows that of the 50 portfolio-year combinations in the 
study, 19 had annual quality indices which fell below their respective 
mean annual quality indices. Of these, only nine combinations, or 47 
percent, recorded performance relatives in excess of their respective 
mean annual performance relatives. On the other hand, of the 31 port-
folio-year combinations whose quality indices were above average, only 
13, or 42 percent, realized above average performance. Thus there is 
no indication of any strong positive correlation between quality and 
performance in most years of the study. 
There does appear to be a slight negative correlation between 
quality and performance in 1966. Of the four companies which had be-
low average quality indices in that year, three performed much worse 
than average. On the other hand, of the six conpanies with above average 
quality rankings three performed better, and three worse than average. 
It would appear, as might be expected, that the lower quality portfolio 
did worse in a market decline than the higher quality portfolio. This 
being the case it is interesting to note that average portfolio quality 
was at its lowest point in two years during the 1966 bear market. This 
would indicate a failure of portfolio management, in this instance, to 
correctly assess impending market conditions and to adjust to meet 
these conditions by moving into a more defensive portfolio position. 
The relationship between the portfolio simulation models developed 
earlier in this chapter and the quality question' should be pointed out 
at this juncture. The reader is reminded that in a significant number 
of cases the original 1964 portfolios of the sample companies performed 
as well as or better than the actual portfolios over the period'of the 
TABLE 12 
PORTFOLIO QUALITY INDICES AND TNVESOMENT PERFORMANCE 
TEN SELECTED COMPANIES: 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 8 
Conpany 
Penn Square Mutual Fund 
Chase Fund of Boston 
Guardian Mutual Fund 
Keystone Series (S~2) Income Fund 
National Securities - Stock Series 
Financial Industrial Fund 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Value Line Fund 
Crown Western Diversified Fund 
Blue Radge Mutual Fund 
Average of All ccnpanies 
Companies with quality ranking, 
below ten-carpany average 
Above average performance 
Below average performance 
Conpanies with quality ranking, 
above ten-conpany average 
Above average performance 
























































































































































study. This is significant in that quality of the initial portfolios 
may be assumed to have at least remained constant over the five-year 
period. In all probability there was actually a quality improvement 
in the initial portfolios as constituent companies became financially 
stronger during this prosperous period. It may be inferred for these 
ten companies, then, that any decrease in portfolio quality over the 
period was largely an unnecessary act on the part of management in that 
it failed to exert a significant positive effect on performance. 
This again raises the question of efficiency of portfolio manage-
ment. In being subjected to lower quality portfolios, the shareholders 
in the ten sample companies were also subjected to return-risk combinations 
which may have differed greatly from the return-risk combinations which 
were originally encountered. If an investor's original decision to 
invest in a given fund was based on an analysis of the return-risk 
characteristics of the portfolio, he may have been left behind, so to 
speak, as portfolio quality deteriorated. 
If the shareholder was able to analyze new portfolio conditions 
and make intelligent choices with respect to continued investment, no 
harm was apparently done by increasing the degree of speculative risk 
in the portfolio. On the other hand, if the investor was relying on 
his portfolio management to select optimum return-risk combinations for 




In this chapter several management variables have been analyzed. 
Portfolio turnover and portfolio quality were found to have little if 
any positive impact on the performance of the ten companies. Mathe-
matical simulation models were constructed to analyze what the invest-
ment performance of the sample oompanies would have been had the various 
companies studied maintained their 1964 portfolio positions without 
trading. In a significant number of cases the ccnpanies would have 
been as well or better off had they completely avoided all portfolio 
activity and retained their 1964 portfolios intact. 
*»* 
CHAPTER IV 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SIMULATION RESULTS 
In Chapter III simulated portfolios were constructed in order to 
show what performance would have resulted had the ten companies in the 
sample maintained their 1964 portfolio positions intact. While the re-
sults of the simulation models are meaningful as they relate to the 
sample companies, the sample is of insufficient size to use for purposes 
of statistical inference. 
In order to test the significance of the sample results with re-
spect to the population of all funds the simulation technique was 
broadened. An additional number of simulated portfolios were constructed, 
and the performance results produced by these models were compared with 
the performance results of a large sample of actual investment companies. 
Statistical tests were then performed to ascertain the significance of 
the observed results. 
To provide a base against which comparisons could be made, the 
sample population of actual companies was increased frcm ten to 34. The 
investment objectives and portfolio turnover characteristics of each of 
these companies were analyzed in an attempt to determine to what extent 
performance was affected by each. 
In order to (tetermine degree of correlation between portfolio turn-
over and portfolio performance, regression functions and sample corre-
lation coefficients were computed for a number of varying turnover-
performance combinations. The correlation analysis included calculation 
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of coefficients of determination. 
The number of simulated portfolios studied was increased from the 
ten used in the previous chapter to fifty. These portfolios were con-
structed according to varying assumptions which will be explained later 
in this chapter. Performance results of the simulated portfolios were 
compared with results of the actual portfolios, and the results of this 
comparison were subjected to analysis of variance. This analysis was 
designed to determine whether there was any significant difference be-
tween performance of the actual conpanies and the unmanaged simulation 
models. 
Characteristics of the Sanple Companies 
In order to provide validity in statistical inference it was felt 
that a much larger sample of actual companies than used in Chapter III 
was necessary. Based on the 322 investment companies listed in the 1964 
edition of Investment Conpanies, a sample of 34 companies was randomly 
selected. This number includes the ten companies analyzed in Chapter III, 
and represents slightly less than 11 percent of the total population. 
The random sampling provided a broad spectrum of investment objectives, 
portfolio turnover, and portfolio performance. Interestingly enough, 
similarity in investment objectives did not insure similarity in rates of 
portfolio turnover or in portfolio performance. As might be expected, 
however, specific objectives—either more or less conservative—did 
influence rate of portfolio turnover. 
"Hfessmann, op. c i t . , 1964 edition, pp. 159-165. 
Table 13 lists the 34 sample companies and their investment ob-
jectives, portfolio turnover rates, and portfolio performance relatives 
for each of the companies in the expanded sample, for each year of the 
study, and for the five-year period. 
This table reveals, as in the case of the ten-company sample ana-
lyzed in Chapter III, that turnover rates in the 1964-1968 period in-
creased markedly over what had been experienced in prior years. The 
34 company average-turnover rate in 1964 was 31 percent. This is com-
pared to the 28.2 percent recorded by the company with the highest 
2 
turnover rate of all companies included in the Wharton study. Over the 
five-year period of this study the 34 company average-turnover rate in-
creased each year, and the 1968 average of 65 percent was more than 
double the average 1964 rate. In succeeding years of the study an in-
creasingly large number of ccnpanies experienced turnover rates in excess 
of 100 percent. In the later years many companies turned their port-
folios over in excess of twice a year, and one company experienced a 
turnover rate of 408 percent. Interestingly, in the year of this abnor-
mally active portfolio, this company also recorded the second lowest 
annual performance relative of the 34 companies in the sample. 
The table shows that companies used vastly different management 
tactics in their portfolios during the period. There was great vari-
ation in portfolio turnover rates among the various companies; and 
Friend, et al., op. cit., p. 214. 
TABLE 13 
PORTFOLIO OBJECTIVES, TUHJOVER, ANDJPERFORMANCE 
34 SELECTED COMPANIES 1964-1968 
Company 
American Business Shares 
Blue Ridge Mutual Fund 
Broad Street Investing 
The Chase Fund of Boston 
Colonial Fund 
Cannonwealth Stock Fund 
Crown Western Diversified Fund 
Devonshire Street Fund 
Fidelity Trend Fund 
Financial Industrial Fund 
Financial Industrial Income Fund 
Franklin Custodian—Cannon Stock Series 
ftom>rai investor's Trust 
Guardian Mitual Fund 
International Investors 
Investor's Research Fund 
Ivy Fund 
Keystone Series (S-2) Income Fund 
Knickerbocker FUnd 
Leon B. Allen Fund 
Liberty Fund 
Locmis-Sayles Capital Development Fund 
National Securities Stock 
Penn Square tiitual Fund 
Hittenhouse Fund 
Supervised Shares 




George Putnam Fund 
Eaton and Howard Income Fund 
Shareholder's Trust of Boston 
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34 Company Averages 31 13.2 37 16 3 44 ( 2 4) 53 30 6 65 17.2 230 79 3 
tn 
even among companies with similar or identical investment objectives. 
Table 14 r which groups the data contained in Table 13 by investment ob-
jectives, illustrates this quite vividly. 
As might be expected, the companies stating growth as their major 
objective experienced the highest rates of portfolio turnover of any 
of the companies, increasing from an average of 47 percent in 1964 to 
98 percent in 1968. While this increase is alarming it is not as dis-
turbing as changes in trading activity on the part of companies with 
less aggressive investment objectives. Particularly disturbing is the 
increase in activity in companies stating income as their primary ob-
jective. Turning their portfolios at the rate of only 20 percent per 
year in 1964, this group quadrupled their average turnover rate to a 
high of 83 percent in 1968. The almost obvious conclusion which must 
be drawn from this observation is that managers of these portfolios 
have abandoned their stated objective of income for the more transitory 
promise of trading profits. 
While funds with other objectives did not increase their trading 
rates as rapidly or to as great an extent as did the income funds, 
they nevertheless increased activity significantly. Each classification 
of fund increased activity in each suTceeding year of the study; and 
in all but one case (funds with the objectives of ijivestment-growth) 
each classification doubled or nearly doubled their rates of portfolio 
turnover during the five-year period. 
In several instances the preceding tables show interesting phenomena. 
For example, while most growth funds showed above average rates of 
turnover, as might be expected,, several growth companies record very 
TABLE 14 
ANNUAL AVERAGE PORTFOLIO TURNOVER 
34 SELECTED COMPANIES 
CLASSIFIED BY INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES 











































































































little or no portfolio activity. On the other hand, funds which, accor-
ding to stated objectives, might be expected to show rather conservative 
portfolio management experienced portfolio turnover rates as high or higher 
than those of most growth companies. Again, while it might be expected 
that the most aggressive companies would realize the best performance, 
the tables show that this is not always the case. Crown Western Diversi-
fied I'und, Guardian Mutual Fund, Keystone Series (S-2) Income Fund, Leon B. 
Allen Fund, Value Line Fund, Vanguard Fund, and Shareholder's Trust of 
Boston all turned their portfolios at rates far in excess (some double 
or triple) the five-year average turnover rate of 230 percent, and yet 
performed at or below the five-year average performance relative of 
79.3 percent. 
Correlation Between Portfolio Turnover and Performance 
Under the assumption that portfolio transactions were effected 
in an attempt to increase portfolio performance, several tests were 
made to determine the strength of the correlation, if any, between turn-
over and performance. 
Thinking that portfolio performance in period t might be influenced 
to the greatest extent by portfolio transactions occurring in period 
t - 1, a regression study was designed to test this relationship. With 
portfolio turnover as the x or independent variable, and portfolio per-
formance as the y or dependent variable, regression functions were 
computed for the ordered pairs x,y where x was considered for period 
t - 1, and y was considered for period t. The following mathematical 
60 
realtionships were used to compute the regression functions used in this 
study: 
y = b - x + ( y - b x ) (4.1) 
where x = 
. I xi 
n 




^ ( x. - x ) y. 
_ 2 
( Xj_ - x ) 
The quantity ( y - b • x ) is the y intercept of the function, and b 
is the slope of the regression function. 
Figure 1 shows the scatter diagrams and regression functions for 
each of the turnover-performance combinations. In each case the 45 line 
superimposed on the scatter diagrams would indicate perfect correlation 
between the two variables. 
It is observed from the figures, that in each case there is ex-
tremely wide dispersion about the regression function, and in no case 
is there any indication of strong correlation between turnover and per-
formance. 1966 turnover and 1967 performance shows the greatest degree 
of correlation, and the slope of this line is only .2792. 1967 turnover 
and 1968 performance relationship shows zero correlation, and 1965 
turnover-1966 performance shows negative correlation. 
3 
Bernard Ostle, Statistics in Research (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa 
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Another set of regression functions were computed to test the 
relationship between portfolio turnover and performance where both 
occurred in period t. The scatter diagrams and regression functions 
contained in Figure 2 indicate that as in the previous case there is 
no significant positive correlation between turnover and performance 
where both occur in the same year. In this analysis the greatest 
degree of correlation occurs in 1967, and the slope of the regression 
function in that year was only .2546. In 1964 the regression function 
had no slope, and 1968 showed a negative function. 
Analyzing the effect which a long-run policy of continuing port-
folio turnover may have had on portfolio performance, Figure 3 shows the 
relationship between total portfolio turnover over the five-year period 
and the five-year performance relative for the same period. While dis-
persion about this regression function is much less than in the annual 
cases, the function has zero slope. This indicates that in the long 
run, portfolio trading in these companies had no effect on the success 
of the portfolio over the five-year period 1964-1968. 
As an alternative method of deteCTtining the mathematical degree of 
correlation between turnover and performance, sample correlation coeffi-
cients, r, were computed as estimates of the population correlation 
coefficients, p. p and r are given by 
y C x ^ x ) . ( y - y ) 4 
p ^ r = ^ = __ = . (4.2) 
V[Z(.-s»»E C y - y ) 2 
T?aro Yamane, S ta t i s t i c s , An Introductory Analysis (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 402-435. 
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FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 2 (Continued) 
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A correlation coefficient of +1 would indicate perfect positive corre-
lation; a coefficient of -1 would indicate perfect negative correlation; 
and zero would indicate no correlation. In order to test the significance 
2 
of p, the coefficient of determination p was also calculated for each 
of the sample coefficients of correlation. The coefficient of deter-
mination explains the extent to which covariability of x and y have been 
2 
explained by p. Thus, if p =1.00, 100 percent of the variability 
5 
between the two variables is explained by p. 
Table 15 summarizes the correlation coefficients and the coefficients 
of determination for the various turnover-performance combinations 
analyzed. 
In half the cases analyzed the population" correlation coefficients 
approach zero, or are negative. This would indicate either no correlation 
or slightly negative correlation between turnover and performance. In 
the remaining five cases the coefficients are slightly positive, but not 
within the range considered necessary to provide dependable assurance 
of true correlation. The lack of correlation between turnover and per-
formance is more dramatically explained with the coefficient of deter-
mination. In the case of the highest correlation coefficient the corres-
ponding coefficient of determination was only .336. This means that only 
33.6 percent of the variance between the two variables has been explained 
by the coefficient of correlation. In the next highest case the coeffi-
cient of determination is .260, and they range sharply downward from that 
point to zero. At zero, of course, none of the variance between the two 
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Again, the most significant period in the study is the five-year 
period 1964-1968. Testing for correlation between total five-year turn-
over and five-year performance the correlation coefficient was found to 
be -.1800. In other words, the results of this analysis indicate that 
not only is there no positive correlation between turnover and perfor-
mance , but when long-run results are considered portfolio activity 
appears to have a slightly deleterious effect on performance. 
Expansion of the Simulation Analysis 
While the results of -che simulation model developed in Chapter III 
were conclusive for the ten companies they related to, their relation-
ship to the population of all mutual funds was not established. In 
order to establish such a relationship application of the simulation 
technique was broadened considerably. 
A total of fifty simulated portfolios were created, including the 
ten portfolios constructed and analyzed in Chapter III. The assumptions 
under which these portfolios were constructed varied somewhat from 
portfolio to portfolio. Ten, of course, were the ten constructed in 
Chapter III, and therefore consisted of the exact securities contained 
in the portfolios of the original ten sample companies analyzed in that 
chapter. The remaining forty portfolios were constructed by drawing 
securities at random from a universe of securities composed of the 900 
securities held in the 1964 portfolios of the ten sample companies con-
sidered in Chapter III. 
The number of securities in each of the forty simulated portfolios 
ranged from a low of only 11 to a high of 168, and the mean portfolio 
consisted of 78 separate securities plus a cash holding. The number of 
securities included in any portfolio was chosen at random, with the 
stipulation that no portfolio would contain more than 200 securities. 
The initial amount invested in each security, including the cash holding, 
in a given portfolio, was identical, and this amount was chosen arbi-
trarily. For example, all securities in portfolio n began 1964 with an 
arbitrarily chosen initial investment of x dollars. This amount varied 
from portfolio to portfolio. Beginning net asset value was therefore 
a function of (1) number of securities in the portfolio; and (2) amount 
of money assigned to each security in the portfolio. Thus 
Nt=0 = n'x 
where N ^ Q = Beginning net asset value of the portfolio, 
n = Number of securities in the portfolio, and 
x = Initial dollar amount assigned to each security in the 
portfolio. 
Capital inputs were determined arbitrarily, and included negative 
and positive inputs, and periods of zero input. Because fourth quarter 
1963 securities prices had not been previously determined, beginning net 
asset values of the simulated portfolios were based on first quarter 1964 
prices. This would have the effect, in most cases, of putting a damper 
on the 1964 and 1964-1968 performance relatives of each of the simulated 
72 
portfolios. In every other respect the assumptions and workings of 
the fifty simulated portfolios analyzed in this section are identical 
to those previously outlined in Chapter III. 
Performance relatives for each simulated portfolio over the period 
of the study are summarized in Table 16 and may be compared with per-
formance relatives for 34 actual conpanies summarized in Table 1 of 
this chapter. 
A much more striking comparison of actual and simulated performance 
is made in Figure 4. This figure contains frequency distributions of 
annual and five-year performance relatives for the 34 actual and 50 
simulated portfolios. These frequency distributions show the periodic 
performance relatives on the x axis, and the percentage of total port-
folios recording given performance relatives on the y axis. As can be 
seen frcm Figure 4 the frequency distributions vividly show the two 
groups of portfolios to have strikingly similar performance in all periods. 
In 1964 the distributions of the two groups are virtually identical, 
and the mean relatives of both groups are very similar. In 1965, the 
simulated portfolios experienced a somewhat higher mean performance 
relative, and the distribution of.simulated performance was skewed slightly 
more toward higher performance than was the distribution of actual per-
formance. Again in 1966 the simulated portfolios performed significantly 
better than did the actual portfolios. Results of the actual companies 
were mixed in 1967, resulting in a multi<-modal distribution. While the 
distribution for the simulated portfolios showed the greatest central 
tendency, the mean performance relative was lower than that of the 
actual companies in that year. This is partially explained by the fact 
TABLE 16 
ANNUAL AND FIVE-YEAR PERFORMANCE RELATIVES 










































































































































































































































































































TABLE 16 (Continued) 
ANNUAL AND FIVE-YEAR PERFORMANCE RELATIVES 
FIFTY SIMULATED PORTFOLIOS 
Simulation Performance 


































































FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF PERFORMANCE RELATIVES 
50 SIMULATED PORTFOLIOS AND 34 ACTUAL PORTFOLIOS 




34 Actual Companies 
50 Simulated Qanpanies 
Actual Mean Performance = 13.2% 
Simulated Mean Performance = 11.3% 
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Actual Mean Performance = 16.3% 
Simulated Mean Performance = 21.8% 
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FIGURE 4 (Continued) 
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that negative performance in the preceding year was greater in the actual 
companies than in the simulated portoflios. Therefore, equal absolute 
dollar increases in 1967 portfolio values would have resulted in a 
higher mean performance relative for the actual companies than for the 
simulated portfolios. In 1968 the two groups of portfolios showed 
approximately the same range of performance, but the simulated portfolios 
recorded a higher mean performance, and much less dispersion about the 
mean than did the actual companies. 
While the annual performance comparisons are extremely meaningful, 
the most significant information is supplied by the five-year comparative 
data. For the entire five-year period the range of performance and the 
mean performance relatives of the two groups of portfolios were virtually 
identical. The mean performance relative for the actual companies was 
79.3 percent compared with 80.5 percent for the simulated portfolios. 
Analysis of Variance of Simulated and Actual Performance 
In order to test the significance of the comparative performance 
data presented above, an analysis of variance was performed. This 
analysis was designed to test for equality of mean performance relatives 
of the actual and simulated portfolios. Specifically, the hypothesis 
tested was that mean performance of the actual companies was equal to 
mean performance of the simulated portfolios. Symbolically the hypothesis 
is stated. 
HQ ; 14= y2 
and Hx : M l^ y2 
o © 
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where ya = mean performance relative of the actual portfolios, and 
u = mean performance relative of the 50 simulated portfolios. 
Variance analysis is designed to test the above hypothesis by con-
structing a ratio, the numerator and denominator of which are unbiased 
2 
estimators of the population variance, cr . The estimator of variance 
used in the numerator is estimated variance between observations within 
each of the two samples. The estimator of variance used in the denomi-
nator is estimated variance between observations from among each of the 
two samples. This ratio has an F probability distribution, and is ex-
pressed mathematically as 
"~J^T 
F = 
IZ4--- T.. n 
where k = The number of samples (two in this case) in each analysis, 
n = The number of observations (34 and 50 each in this case) 




Summation of the valuas of the observations in each sample, 
Summation of all Tk, 
x.. = The i th observation in the j th sample, 
lj 
The hypothesis is tested at some level of significance, designated 
Fa • Fa is determined according to k-1 and n-k degrees of freedom. The 
Ibid., pp. 610-639. 
decision rule used in testing the hypothesis was: If F<F , accept H . 
If not, accept H-. 
In this study the hypothesis was tested at two levels of signifi-
cance, .05 and .01. The results of each of these tests are summarized 
in Table 17. 
At the .01 level there is but a one percent probability of accepting 
the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis should be accepted. 
At this level the null hypothesis was accepted in each year, and for 
the five year period 1964-1968. That is, at this level of significance 
there was found to be no significant difference between mean performance 
of the 34 actual and 50 simulated portfolios. 
This is extremely significant in that it indicates with almost per-
fect reliability that over the five years included in this study a ran-
domly selected and relatively unmanaged securities portfolio would have, 
on the average, performed as well as a professionally managed portfolio. 
If management and custodial fees paid by fund shareholders to their re-
spective companies had been deducted from the net returns of the actual 
portfolios, the performance balance would, in all liklihood, have been 
shifted in favor of the simulated portfolios. Unfortunately this type 
of analysis was prevented because of unavailability of information re-
garding management costs. 
At the .05 level of significance the null hypothesis was accepted 
in 1964, 1966, 1967, and for five-year period. In 1965 and 1968, how-
ever, the alternative hypothesis was accepted. That is, in those two 
years mean performance of the 50 simulated portfolios was found to be 
significantly superior to that of the 34 actual portfolios. 
p ° ° 
I o 
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TABLE 17 
HYPOTHESIS TESTS: VL = P2 
F a # 0 5 (1,82 d.f.)=3.97 Fa.01(1,82 d.f.)=7.04 
Period F Ratio Decision Rule Decision Rule 
1964 2.68 Accept H0 Accept H0 
1965 6.13 Accept Hj Accept H0 
1966 1.96 Accept H0 Accept H0 
1967 3.76 Accept H0 Accept HQ 
1968 4.16 Accept Hi Accept H0 
1964-1968 0.02 Accept H0 Accept H0 
This means that with but 5 percent chance of error it could be 
predicted that a randomly drawn, unmanaged portfolio would have, on 
the average, performed as well as or better than a professionally man-
aged portfolio during the period 1964-1968. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter several analyses were performed in order to partially 
test the null hypothesis presented in Chapter II. With respect to these 
analyses it was found that while portfolio turnover increased markedly 
over the five-year period 1964-1968, this increased turnover had little 
effect on portfolio performance. Linear regression and correlation 
analyses were performed, and these indicated no correlation between 
portfolio turnover and performance in any of the years included in the 
study or for the five-year period of the study. It was also shown that 
many companies who might be expected, by virtue of their stated invest-
ment objectives, to follow a rather conservative investment policy, 
increased their rates of portfolio turnover drastically during the period 
of the study. Rapid increases in turnover such as these were apparently 
the results of attempts to make a tradeoff tetween returns from a long 
run investment tactic and the profits resulting from more active trading. 
The futility in this policy is underlined by the complete lack of corre-
lation between trading activity and portfolio return. 
The simulation technique developed in Chapter III was broadened 
through development of additional simulated portfolios. These port-
folios were constructed with randomly drawn securities and arbitrarily 
determined initial investment positions. The performance results of 
these simulated portfolios compared with the performance of 34 actual 
companies revealed no significant differences in portfolio performance. 
The results of this comparison were subjected to statistical 
analysis of variance. The conclusion reached as a result of this 
analysis was that, on the average, an unmanaged portfolio consisting 
of randomly drawn securities would have performed as well as a pro-
fessionally managed portfolio during the 1964-1968 period. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding chapters provide the reader with a glimpse of the 
techniques used by mutual funds in their portfolio-management function, 
and with indications of the efficiency with which these techniques 
produce results. Specifically the study was designed to critically 
analyze several management variables by determining their impact on 
portfolio performance. The study was based on an analysis of the null 
hypothesis that mutual fund management, in the 1964-1968 period, was 
efficient in its portfolio management function. 
This chapter will summarize the findings of the study and state 
conclusions with respect to the hypothesis. 
Summary 
Analysis of Ten Selected Companies 
In order to partially test the null hypothesis, ten open-end invest-
ment conpanies were selected for study. The performance of each of 
these companies was observed, and the influence on performance of several 
management variables was analyzed. 
It was found that the portfolio managers of these ten companies 
drastically increased rate of portfolio trading in their respective funds 
over the five-year period of the study. This was true not only for those 
companies who espoused an aggressive investment objective, but also for 
companies whose stated objectives would indicate a more conservative invest 
85 
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ment policy. In no case was there any evidence to indicate a positive 
correlation between portfolio turnover and performance. 
Timing of the turnover decision was analyzed with respect to its 
effect on performance. Again, there was no evidence that portfolio 
turnover, regardless of when it occurred, positively influenced sub-
sequent portfolio performance. There was, in fact, some indication 
that portfolio managers of the ten companies failed to make portfolio 
adjustments in anticipation of the 1966 bear-market movement, and in-
stead, in reaction to the movement, made portfolio adjustments after 
the movement was well underway. 
As portfolio turnover was found to have increased over the period, 
so also was a deterioration in portfolio quality observed in the ten 
companies studied. This deterioration in quality was measured on a 
quality-ranking scale adapted from Standard and Poor's common stock ranking 
scale. Almost without exception each of the ten companies adopted more 
speculative portfolios during the study period than those with which they 
began the period. 
In order to further test the null hypothesis mathematical simula-
tion models of investment company portfolios were constructed. These 
models were based on the assumption that each of the ten actual companies 
maintained its beginning 1964 portofolio position intact over the entire 
period of the study. In the majority of cases it was shown that the 
companies would have been as well or better off had they maintained 
their January 1, 1964 portfolios without management, entering into no 
trading whatsoever. This finding was strengthened when commissions 
paid on securities transactions were included in the analysis. 
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Expansion of the Sample Size 
• ft » ^ ^ w w » w i i i i ^ w • ^ • • • ! ! • • i i urn 
In order to provide a stronger foundation for statistical inference 
portions of the analyses performed on the ten ccnpanies were expanded 
and applied to a larger sample of actual and simulated companies. 
Portfolio turnover rates for 34 actual investment companies were 
computed and were found, as in the ten-company case, to have increased 
markedly over previous years. Regression and correlation analyses were 
performed in attempt to determine the extent of the correlation, if 
any, between portfolio turnover and portfolio performance. In each case 
tested no significant positive correlation was observed. In several 
cases, including the entire five-year period, a negative relationship 
between turnover and performance was indicated by the analysis. 
In order to test the effectiveness of a policy of active turnover, 
50 simulated mutual fund portoflios were constructed under a number of 
differing assumptions and conditions. In each case the simulated port-
folios were held static, however, in that no security issue was added 
to or deleted from the January 1, 1964 portfolio position over the en-
suing five-year period. Portfolio results of the actual and simulated 
portfolios were compared and found to be strikingly similar. The stati-
stical technique of variance analysis was applied to the two samples. 
It was determined with this analysis, at extremely high levels of signi-
ficance, that no significant difference existed between the mean perfor-
mance measures of the two groups of portfolios. That is, on the average, 
the unmanaged, simulated portfolio performed as well as the professionally 
managed portfolio during the 1964-1968 period. 
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v Conclusions 
Based on the results of this study as presented in the preceding 
chapters, it is concluded that the null hypothesis is hot valid, and 
that the alternative hypothesis must be accepted. Over the five-year 
period covered by the study there is no indication that, on the 
average, mutual fund managers acted in an efficient manner. 
In a Markowitzian sense of the word "efficiency," individual mutual 
fund shareholders should have placed their investment dollars in an 
optimal return-risk situation. If it is assumed that January 1, 1964 
portfolios were, for seme reason, efficient in that they represented 
this optimal condition, the condition must have been violated in future 
years. Increasingly intense portfolio trading in ensuing years failed 
to raise returns above levels which would have been realized had no 
trading occurred. A rational investor, given the opportunity, a priori, 
to select between a portfolio with r return and no trading, and a 
portfolio with r return and intensive trading, would certainly select 
the former. In forcing the second alternative on shareholders, mutual 
fund management, in a sense, abandoned the fiduciary responsibility given 
them by their shareholders in that shareholders were subjected to less-
than-optimal return—variance of return combinations. 
Mutual fund managers were inefficient in another sense in that 
shareholders were burdened with the costs of trading which was largely 
ineffectual in increasing portfolio performance. While trading costs 
are not considered in the measure of fund performance either by the in-
dustry or in this study, their net effect is to reduce the effective rate 
89 
of portfolio return to the individual shareholder. Thus the shareholder 
in the intensively managed fund has been forced to accept a lower expected 
return than his counterpart in a less intensively managed fund. Under 
the assumption that ownership costs could have been cut had management 
costs been lower, fund managers, in maintaining high levels of portfolio 
turnover, did not act in the best interests of their shareholders. 
While the macro implications of this increasingly intensive port-
folio management were not considered in this study they are nevertheless 
deserving of mention. It would appear that the great strains imposed on 
the securities markets in recent years have been caused, to some undeter-
mined extent, by the mutual fund portfolio policies which have been 
examined in this paper. Many broker. 3$e houses have found themselves in 
>> 
serious difficulties, and several havV'. been forced to close their doors 
71 
as a result of increased stock market*activity. If, as this study has 
shown, increasingly intensive portfolio management is without the fruits 
of increased performance, funds are guilty of contributing to the de-
creased efficiency of the securities ̂ markets. Further research, designed 
to reveal the extent of investment company contributions to this problem, 
is certainly in order. 
The reader is reminded that this study was designed only to criti-
cally analyze investment company performance during a specific market 
period. The extent to which the results of this study are applicable 
to institutions other than mutual funds, and to periods other than the 
one studies is unknown. By all means, however, the results of the study 
are of sufficient strength to encourage both individual and institutional 
90 
investors to carefully review their portfolio practices and policies. 
Likewise, broadly based research into effectiveness of portfolio manage' 
ment is indicated. The questions to be answered by such a study are of 
iirport to both individual investors and to the securities markets as 
a whole. If intelligent investing decisions are to be made by the 
public and by investing institutions it is vital to know the extent to 
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